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HUMANITIES EDUCATION THEN, Now, 
AND WHY: EDUCATIONAL METAPHORS 
l\V,RSHALL GREGORY 
BCTLER Ul\:IVERSlTI 
Academics are suckers for sexy educational metaphors-education is 
trekking from the caye of ignorance to the sunshine of knowledge; 
teaching is not being the sage on the stage but the guide on the side; 
the teacher is a midwife, a coach, a guru, a shepherd, a missionary, a 
mountaineer; students are little pitchers, their brains are warehouses 
full of facts, they learn by encoding data in their ROMs, and on and 
on-but the bad news about flashy educational metaphors that stomp 
down the linguistic runways of educational discourse like models at a 
Paris fashion show is, first, that the JfI1JI' we haye of their aptness often 
disguises their inability to map onto the complexities of education in 
all of the detail that a full, non-metaphorical account might provide, 
and, second, that once we find ourselves pleased with some sense of a 
metaphor's aptness, howe\'er misled that seme might be, we fail to see 
the extent to which the metaphor drains our willingness to be self-crit-
ical. 
The problem of educational metaphors in the humanities is that the 
metaphors driving the humanities since the late J-.1iddle Ages and the 
Renaissance-metaphors that educators still rely on today-no longer 
work in the twenty-first century. Social circumstances, political 
processes, the kinds of work that people do, attitudes about the good 
life and who gets to lead it, the density and size of population centers, 
and, abow all, the uses that people imagine and demand of education 
are all so different now from what these were in the Middle Ages and 
the Renaissance that the metaphors of humanistic education appropri-
ate then are not only not always appropriate now, but are sometimes 
downright dysfunctional. Yet, generally speaking, academic humanists 
haw not thought this issue through in either the historical or philo-
sophical wa\'s that might help us see why we ha\'e lost so much 
ground, much less what to do about it, not only in the world beyond 
the walls of academe but inside those walls itself (all through the 
twentieth century and into the present). \'V'hat I propose to do in this 
essay is to provide both an historical and conceptual analysis of the 
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long-standing metaphors that keep the humanities 10 contemporary 
universities and colleges confused about their mission and methodol-
ogy. I will then offer an alternative way of thinking about the function 
of the humanities in contemporary uniycrsities and colleges that, I 
hope, may help us out of our long impasse. 
ONE HISTORICAL TAKE ON THE HUMANITIES 
Historically, it is important to distinguish certain domains of human 
achievement generally associated with the humanities-languages, lit-
erature, history, philosophy, and so on-from the humanities-as-aca-
demic-disciplines because these domains of achievement have existed 
much longer and on a much wider scope than the academic humani-
ties that have been developed to study them. Speaking a language, 
telling stories and myths, narrating the past, and inquiring into reasons 
are universal and primal activities that human beings invented as cop-
ing strategies, presumably, to live better lives. The humanities as aca-
demic disciplines, however, are neither primal human faculties in the 
sense that language is a primal human faculty, nor are the humanities 
uni\'ersal. 
The humanities as academic disciplines were inycnted in the 
\'':;estern world in the late medieval and Renaissance universities of 
Europe, and they were born of trauma, loss, and hope. The trauma 
and loss stemmed from the collapse of what we now call "classical" 
Greek and Roman civilization in the se\'enth and eighth centuries of 
the modern historical era, the ci\'ilization that medieval scholars called 
"antiquity" or "the ancients." As the texts, institutions, Sophistical 
training, philosophers' inquiries, the chants of the rhapsodes, and 
other supports of learning that had maintained a fairly stable thread of 
cultural coherence from the time of Homer, Plato's Academy, and the 
lamentations of Empedocles through the entire reign of Rome all col-
lapsed as the Roman empire shrunk and shattered, the classical learn-
ing that had been at least 2000 years in the making quickly degraded 
into physical fragments and mere memories as manuscripts got torn 
apart, separated, carted to Constantinople, burned in the library at 
Alexandria, carried to the 1Iiddle East and translated into Arabic, and, 
in thousands of instances, just plain lost. As the texts disappeared, so 
did the apparatus of scholarship, libraries, and educated commentary 
that not only depended on them but that kept them alive as intellectu-
al, moral, ethical, and civic touchstones. Most educated persons in 
r 
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medieval Europe-the few-knew about these texts b\' title and 
author, or about many of them at least, but hardly anyone possessed 
access to them, especially full access to complete works, Thus, what-
ever learning did survive in the Middle Ages was burdened by a pro-
found despair over the \'ast loss of knowledge from classical times. 
110st of those who lamented this loss had no idea of the real extent 
of it, but it is not difficult to suppose that vagueness over the size of 
the loss only increased the sense of its \-astness. 
As classical learning disappeared or became fragmented across 
Europe, one important consequence among many is that its lost con-
tents tended to become mythologized, idealized, and, since that learn-
ing could no longer be interrogated or developed directly, static. In the 
;"1iddle Ages, the learning that had been embodied in Greek and 
Roman ci\'ilization no longer enjoyed an organic, vital life subject to 
criticism, refinement, debate, and development. As medieval learning 
became further and further remm-ed from any direct contact with the 
complete texts that had once conveyed the \vords and thoughts of 
Homer, Plato, Aristotle, Ovid, Cicero, Virgil, Terence, and so on, the 
few survi\-ing words of these authors ceased playing the role of lilJinc~ 
words and became words of authority from another realm, a golden 
realm that became more and more idealized over time. The words and 
echoes-of-words from that golden time were granted the status of 
trump cards in any discussion, or, in an analogy perhaps more appro-
priate to the mindset of a culture dominated by the vast bureaucracy 
of the Catholic church, the words and thoughts from ancient times 
came to be treated on the model of authoritative words from the pope 
and other church dignitaries, and viewed as second only to biblical 
words in prestige and reverence. 
A perfect example of the elevation to dogma of words and ideas 
from classical texts-and thus a perfect example of how those words 
ceased to operate dialogically in western thought-is the way 
Aristotle's inductively descriptive comment in Chapter Five of the 
Poetics about the time span usually represented by a tragedy ("Tragedy 
endeavors, as far as possible, to confine itself to a single revolution of 
the sun" [51]) gradually became elevated in European theory and prac-
tice of drama into the dogma of the Unities of Time, Place, and 
Action. Corneille and Racine might have preferred to appear at court 
in their underwear as pen a drama that violated Aristotle's "law" of 
dramatic l'nities, only Aristotle wrote no such law. Given his aims in 
.. 
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the Poetics-to prm'ide a taxonomy of the aesthetic infrastructure of 
tragic effects-his comment about a "single revolution of the sun" is 
a descriptive comment-it's not analytical and certainly isn't prescrip-
ti\'e-but once the words of Aristotle or am' other classical author 
were brought into a medieval conversation, they functioned to close 
off discussion, not lead to further analysis and investigation. (It wasn't 
until at least the middle of the Renaissance that European scholars 
could begin to compare classical texts or to see the words they quoted 
in their full context.) In his own time, Aristotle was an active philoso-
pher muscularly wrestling with difficult problems that might call for a 
different analysis wmorrmv from the one he offered today, but in the 
Middle Ages he began to be treated on the model of an ecclesiastical 
author who ga\'e answers rather than formulated problems. 
I have said that the humanities were born of trauma, loss, and hope. 
The hope upon which the academic humanities \vas founded, a hope 
that also prm'ided them with an educational mission, began in the 
Renaissance with the recovef\' and textual "cleaning" of classical texts, 
activities that became a growth industry for scholars for more than 200 
years. Intact manuscripts in Constantinople that had been fragmented 
in the \Xfest for centuries began to make their way back to such univer-
sities as those in Padua, Bologna, Florence, Oxford, and Cambridge. 
""Ianuscripts that had been carried to Arabia by triumphant ""luslims in 
the eighth centuf\' began to show up in Europe again in the 1100s and 
1200s, in part a ripple effect of the Crusades. As European state 
economies became more prosperous and resources could be de\'oted 
to pursuits other than war and commerce, scholars were funded to 
search for "antique" manuscripts in ruins, ancient temples, monaster-
ies, churches, and private collections. As these manuscripts began to be 
reco\'ered, collated, re-translated, emended, commented on, restored, 
and made generally available not just to scholars, but, with the inven-
tion of Gutenberg'S printing press in 1439, to a general public eager 
for a sense of connection with the wisdom of "the ancients," Europe's 
sense of the precious value of these texts settled to the bottom of cul-
tural and academic sensibility so deeply-and hardened there so 
strongly-that still today a nearly absolute commitment to the inher-
ent value of texts provides the starting point for how most academics 
define the content and mission of a humanities education in the 
Anglo-European world. 
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THE MISSION OF THE HUMANITIES THEN: 
THE METAPHORS DRIVING THE CHARIOT 
From these embarrassingly sketchy historical remarks, it is eaS\' to 
see that the mission of the humanities in the medincal and Renaissance 
universities was naturally conceived as a mission of (1) recovering pre-
cious and ancient formulations of wisdom, and (2) stocking knowl-
edge of ancient texts in students' minds and memories as models of 
conduct, principles of ethics, and touchstones of truth. (It didn't hurt 
that the requisite ability to read Latin and sometimes Greek helped ele-
vate the educated person to a vastly higher plane of social ascendancy 
than that occupied by ordinary people.) 
The driving metaphors of the humanities, the metaphors that cap-
tured the abstractness of this educational mission and put it in contact 
with domains of sensation and everyday experience were metaphors 
of refinement (as in refining gold from the impurities of ore) and virtue 
(as in education's po\ver to elevate the learner's moral character). Sir 
Philip Sidney succinctly displays the t\'pical manner in which 
Renaissance humanists talked about the refining power and Yirtue-
instiljjng effects of education, especially of literary education. "To 
what immediate end soever DearningJ be directed," says Sidney in An 
~-ipo/~~yjor Poelr), (1595), 
thejll/a/ fIId is to /ead alld droJl' tiS to as bZ~h a pofeetioll as our dq"eII-
mlfe .lOuis, lIIade Jl'orse by tbeir dllyey /od/!,in/! .. I, ellll be capable of l· .. J 
h(ll'iIZ~ this Jrope-to kno1J\ and by knouied!!,f to liji up tbe mindf;-ol)J 
tbe dtlllgeotl of tbe bod)' to tbe enjoying of his Ollin dil'ine mel1ce. 
A few sentences later, Sidney adds the summative claim, "the ftlding end 
of II/I fartNy learning bein!!, llirttlof{s action, those ski/Is, that most seme to bri/l/!, 
forth that, iJal'e a most jNst title to be princes Ol'IT 1111 the rest" (159, italics 
added). 
These metaphors of the body as "clayey lodgings" and a "dun-
geon," in contrast to the ethereal properties of "knowledge," "divine 
essence," and "virtuous action," clearly enunciate a view that knowl-
edge is a kind of magical elixir that, once its essence is imbibed by the 
learner, automatically drives out the ore of gross ignorance and lifts 
the learner into some "improved" moral and intellectual version of 
himself. The methodology of this kind of learning is either friction or 
swa//Olving. the learner either rubs up against (or swallows) the illustri-
ous texts from classical times. It is worth quoting a passage from 
Sidney at length here that illustrates the time honored methodology of 
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the humanities: put unrefined students in a room with great books 
and, l'Oild, you get better people when they come out. 
Anger, the Stoics say, ,,'as a short madness; let but Sophocles 
bring you Ajax on a stage, killing and whipping sheep and 
oxen, thinking them the army of Greeks, with their chieftains 
Agamemnon and Menelaus, and tell me if you have not a 
more familiar insight into anger than finding in the schoolmen 
his genus and difference. See whether wisdom and temper-
ance in Ulysses and Diomedes, valor in Achilles, friendship in 
Nisus and Euryalus, even to an ignorant man carry not an 
apparent shining, and contrarily, the remorse of conscience in 
Oedipus, the soon repenting pride of Agamemnon, the self-
devouring cruelty in his father Atreus, the violence of ambi-
tion in the two Theban brothers, the sour-sweetness of 
revenge in ~Iedea, and [ ... J finally, all virtues, vices, and pas-
sions so in their own natural seats laid to the view, that we 
seem not to hear of them, but clearly to see through them. 
(161 ) 
These are exactly the sorts of claims in favor of a humanities edu-
cation that one is likely to hear in any literature or history classroom in 
the U. S. today: "rub up against this great material I'm giving you, dear 
students, and it will both penetrate and purify, lifting you up to a high-
er plane of thinking and feeling." I quote Sidney only because he is so 
eloquent, not because he is singular. He is speaking from the center of 
a tradition of discourse that both precedes him and succeeds him. 
Petrarch, for example, the artist whom we extol today primarily as the 
father of the sonnet but who was primarih' known in his own da,' as a 
humanist who enjoyed remarkable success in discovering and distrib-
uting works from the classical period (some of Cicero's letters, for 
example), asserts a few years before his death in 1374 but more than 
200 years before Sidney's Apology, that the study of the great Roman 
authors, Cicero, Seneca, and Horace, in particular, penetrate the learn-
er with almost miraculous powers of moral and even physical elevation: 
[These works] stamp and drive deep into the heart the 
sharpest and most ardent stings of speech, by which the lazy 
are startled, the ailing kindled, and the sleepy aroused, the sick 
healed and prostrate raised and those who stick to the ground 
lifted up to the highest thoughts and to honest desire. Then 
earthly things become vile; the aspect of vice stirs up an enor-
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mous hatred of vicious life; virtue and 'the shape, and as it 
were, the face of honesty,' are beheld by the inmost eye 'and 
inspire miraculous 100'e' of wisdom and of themsekes, as 
Plato says. (156) 
\XTho knew that humanistic education could not only yield honest 
desires but also heal the sick? Defense of humanistic education in 
these extravagant terms prevailed long and powerfully, however, and 
nearly every subsequent commentator on humanistic education clung 
tenaciously to this mode of talk. We have already seen Sidney, 200 
years after Petrarch, saying much the same thing, and even cursory his-
torians of education will find it easy to hear the reverberations of this 
kind of discourse 250 years after Sidney in Shelley's Defense 0/ Poet~)' 
(1840), where we find him confidently and rhapsodically asserting that 
Homer embodied the ideal perfection of his age in human 
character; nor can we doubt that those who read his verses 
were awakened to an ambition of becoming like to Achilles, 
Hector, and Ulysses. [ ... J [T]he sentiments of the auditors 
must have been refined and enlarged bv a sympathy with such 
great and lm'ely impersonations. (502) 
The mission of the humanities based on this vision and these 
metaphors (note how Shelley introduces the new but complementary 
metaphor of sympathy) ruled European education for more than 600 
years, depending on how precisely anyone wishes to delineate the 
beginning date of the modern humanities. As I have already indicated, 
the ending date for this kind of discourse, despite the changes that 
have occurred in both society and in academe, has not yet been 
reached. 
For the 600 years prior to the last half of the nineteenth century, 
schoolboys learned their Latin-and the bright ones learned Greek-
so that they could metaphorically rub up against the lovely representa-
tions from classical literature, history, and philosophy, and, by means 
of contagion, absorption, swallowing, or sympathy, improve their 
moral character and their ethical practice. Generation after generation 
of privileged schoolboys translated a certain number of lines from 
Virgil or Cicero or Aristotle every single day, usually Virgil, and, as we 
all know, dutifully showed up, without exception, to take their turn at 
occupying positions of social and political leadership as persons of 
wisdom, grace, generosity, and enlightened views. 
Except, of course, that they didn't. Some of the European school-
j 
I 
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boys who received a classical humanities education turned out to be 
great men-heroes and statesmen-but others turned out to be rigid 
protectors of patriarchal privilege, racists, xenophobes, and architects 
of the European colonization and oppression of Africa, India, and 
Asia, not to mention being the architects of the politics that blasted 
western civilization with two world wars occurring within the first fifty 
years of the twentieth century. \'\/here are the civilizing and morally 
uplifting effects of a humanities education to be traced in these 
events? 
Ewn those of us who are steeped in the humanities up to our eyes 
know that there is often a huge gap between the typical promises of 
"improvement" supposedly generated by a humanities education and 
the everyday performance of those who actually have that education, 
man\' of whom-our colleagues-manifest motives and emotions not 
noticeably formed by the heroic courage of Achilles or the lordly gen-
erosity of Aeneas. And even those among us who are decent and gen-
erous are not likely to attribute our good moral character to having 
performed the modern educational equivalent of the Victorian school-
boy's translation of forty lines of Virgil a day as an exercise in drudg-
ery and tedium. 
Criticism of the inefficacy of a humanities education is often much 
more potent than merely pointing out that humanists are sometimes 
more like hypocrites from Tartufle than like heroes from the OdYHey. 
An exaggerated and misguided belief in the automatic uplift of classi-
cal education often lies at the heart of the deeply bitter accusations 
against it made by thinkers such as Elie Wiesel and George Steiner, 
,vho seem ne\'er to tire of pointing out that the humanities education 
received by many of Europe's political leaders in the early part of the 
twentieth century did nothing to prevent the Holocaust or the spread 
of fascism across Europe in the middle years of the century. It is hard-
ly necessary to point out the vast chasm between the Holocaust on the 
one hand and Petrarch's claim on the other hand that in the classical-
ly educated learner, "the aspect of vice stirs up an enormous hatred of 
vicious life." Steiner makes the case with his usual \-ividness. 
\X'e now know [ ... J that the formal excellence and numerical 
extension of education need not correlate with increased 
social stability and political rationality. [ ... J In other words, the 
libraries, museums, theatres, universities, research centers, in 
and through which the transmission of the humanities and of 
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the sciences mainly takes place, can prosper next to the con-
centration camps. [ ... J Men such as Hans Frank who admin-
istered the "final solution" in Eastern Europe were avid con-
noisseurs and, in some instances, performers of Bach and 
Mozart. \'(Ie know of personnel in the bureaucracy of the tor-
turers and of the O\'ens who culti\'ated a knowledge of 
Goethe, a love of Rilke. (77) 
THE MISSION OF THE HUMANITIES NOW: A CRITIQUE OF THE 
ACADEMIC OBSESSION WITH CURRICULUM 
I can read some of your minds right now, wondering why it seems 
relevant to me to rehearse all of this ancient history. I can picture YOU 
wishing to say to me, perhaps with some annoyance, that, in fact, the 
humanities have undergone at least one or two fundamental restruc-
turings since the middle of the nineteenth century that now make all 
of this history irrelevant, or, if not irrelevant absolutely, mostly irrele-
vant to any search for solutions to our contemporary problems. 
Perhaps you subscribe to the com'entional view of academic history in 
the twentieth century which says that, beginning in the 1960s, human-
ists finally liberated themselves from the futility of classical education 
by changing the curriculum, and that, by embracing postmodernism 
(from roughly 1970-2000) we have retooled the humanities to meet the 
needs of our t\venty-first-century students entering an American soci-
ety where white ethnicity, patriarchal \'alues, traditional Anglo-
American \·alues, and an uncritical belief in either the virtue of our 
founding fathers or the transparent good will of our political and 
social leaders no longer go unchallenged. The second stage of our lib-
eration, the postmodern stage, like every other stage of academic 
development, concentrated on curricular reform, and, in addition, 
cultiyated a hermeneutics of suspicion that invites learners to protect 
themselves against texts' disguised ideologies such as traditional forms 
of "ethics" and "law and order." Having become knowledgeable about 
theory-laden facts and the inevitable reduction of all arguments to the 
rhetorical struggle for dominance, not truth, we congratulate ourselves 
on having become savvy. We have changed, you may wish to say: my 
parents' humanities are not my humanities. 
In truth, if reln'ance is the appropriate criterion for evaluating 
these claims, I think they mosth· aren't. Curricular reform and reading 
practices are concerns that are indeed important and worthy of sus-
" 
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tained thought, but, nevertheless, these important concerns mostly 
miss the even more important points that need to be made about 
humanities education, points that I am eager to make before I finish. 
However, I must begin my reply with a fe\v concessions. 
It is certainly true that from 1870-1970, and especially from 1970 to 
the present, the circumstances of education in America ha\·e changed 
profoundly, and it is also true that, to some extent, the humanities have 
changed along with them. \X'e have endured the trauma of attacks 
from logical positivism that spanned the closing decades of the nine-
teenth century and the opening decades of the hventieth century. We 
have survived the competition of scientific education that surged dur-
ing the Sputnik era and led to sustained government funding on a huge 
scale for uni\'ersity science research. (\X'e have "survived" this compe-
tition, at least, in the sense that we have not disappeared.) We have 
kept watch as the ancient aims of humanities education, character 
development and social responsibility, have given wa\' to the aims of 
research as the research university created in Germany in the eigh-
teenth century made its way to America first at Johns Hopkins 
Uni\·ersity in 1876, then at the University of Chicago in 1890, and now 
everywhere. W'e have seen education as a community enterprise based 
on face-to-face relations turn itself into a corporate octopus with 
armies of administrators marching in all directions and tentacles of 
"outreach" that go ever)where at once, into government funding, into 
the community, into evening instruction, into "semesters abroad" pro-
grams, into surging new majors in pre-professional fields, into pro-
grams of massive endowment growth, into online courses, and into 
"enrollment JJlana/!,eJJlent" rather than student recruiting (meaning that 
colleges and universities now know how, no less than shampoo or car 
manufacturers, to "spotlight their demographic" rather than simply 
open their doors to young people who wish to become educated). We 
have seen our campuses transformed from the fairly austere physical 
facilities they were in the 1950s, consisting of bare classrooms, cold 
dorm rooms, and scruffy pla\·ing fields, into the typically lush facilities 
of contemporary campuses marked by health-and-fitness centers 
complete with Olympic pools and climbing walls, field houses and sta-
diums that bring to mind colossal Egyptian temples, 24-hour food 
courts, hot cookies and free massages during exam week, and, in short, 
amenities that make most American college campuses look like centers 
of assisted living for wealthy twenty-year-olds. \X'e ha\'e seen the per-
r 
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centage of high school graduates in this country who go to college 
grow from about 15%, in the 1950s to more than 65'10 today. And we 
have seen the nature of campus culture and classroom instruction turn 
itself over and oyer as the technologies of photocopiers, computers, 
Google "research," internet plagiarism, "mediated classrooms," "click-
er" feedback, paperless classrooms, cell phones in class, "instant mes-
saging," customized textbooks, and wireless connection have come to 
be common on all campuses. 
In the humanities, classics departments have disappeared, English 
departments have transformed themselves from centers of canonical 
study into centers of culture studies, and language departments have 
seen French and German shrink as they now teach endless sections of 
Spanish, pride themselves on teaching languages that would once have 
been considered "exotic" (such as Japanese, Hindi, and Chinese), and 
run complex media labs in which students can do anything from watch 
foreign films and European soap operas to receive endlessly available 
instruction via headphones on pronunciation subtleties and conversa-
tional conventions. Philosophy departments are now as likely to teach 
"business ethics" as the\' are to teach the Apolog)" and history depart-
ments gave up teaching European and American survey classes back 
in the eighties in order to introduce history courses that veer sharply 
away from the traditional instruction in "big moments" and "impor-
tant figures." In light of all of these changes-if, indeed, our parents' 
humanities is not our humanities-why is the history of humanities 
education relevant? 
The beginning of the answer is that, somehow, just like the theory 
that schoolboys who translate Virgil e\'ery day should automatically 
turn out to be morally superior but then don't, we find that the 
changes and reforms we have advanced \vith such energy and good 
will to persuade our students that a humanities education is superior 
to pre-professional training aren't actually doing the job. \X'e find, sadly, 
that our arguments on this front not only do not stop students stream-
ing steadily away from humanities majors, but wouldn't persuade a 
grass cricket to sing in high summer. Every year since the early seven-
ties, the number of students who major in humanities disciplines gets 
smaller. The 1960s mantra of "is this relevant?" still sounds like a fresh 
and cogent question to contemporary students who are asked to read 
the poems of John Donne and Thomas Gray in British literature sur-
vey classes. The fact that we are now likely to teach Julian of Norwich 
.. 
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and Mary \'V'ollstonecraft along with Donne and Gra\' has not generat-
ed any collective response of "ah, noU'I get the humanities." Students 
are flocking to pre-professional majors. Every revision of a liberal arts 
Core program in every school inevitabl~' winds up decreasing the 
required hours that students must spend in classes of literature, histo-
ry, language, or philosoph\,. Humanities professors wring their hands 
and deplore the barbarian hordes at the gates of civilization. They feel 
professionally assaulted and demeaned, and they are. In response, the\' 
blame television, the internet, commercialism, capitalism, and Pop 
Tarts. "\\'hy isn't our stuff working for us?" we ask. "\X;e have changed 
so much, and we are so well intentioned." 
Pardon me, but it isn't so. As for our good intentions, the~' are, to 
adapt John Nance Garner's enluation of the vice-presidency, "not 
worth a pitcher of warm spit." I don't mean that we shouldn't haw 
good intentions-let us always be well-intentioned, and, while we are 
at it, nia-but neither good intentions nor niceness will solve any of 
our problems. As for humanists' claim that they have changed so 
much, the onl\' part of their educational program that humanities edu-
cators have enr tinkered with in any systematic, thoughtful way is the 
ClInimlutlJ. Curricular reform, curricular tinkering, and explanations of 
the wonderful aims accomplished by the curriculum are favorite facul-
ty obsessions. The myopia with which educators in general suppose 
that every problem in education has either a curricular fix or no fix-
and humanities educators are not only no exception to this principle, 
but are, in truth, more wedded to it than any other constituency in 
academe-is, frankly, breathtaking. 
It is breathtaking because there are a large number of obvious con-
siderations showing us, if we would only look, that the curriculum is 
fairly far down on the list of crucially important variables that deter-
mine how fully and effectively students learn, but humanities teachers 
by and large ignore these considerations. They do so not because this 
issue is too subtle for them to see or to think about-we are all smart 
people-but because no matter how far down on the list of crucial 
yariables the curriculum ma\" be for students, it is vital!)' important for 
faculty members. The curriculum may be, let us say, the eighth most 
important component of our students' education, but it's always first 
on the faculty's own list because the curriculum is where faculty spe-
cialties exist, and it is thus where faculty interests and futures and 
career-making exist. So far, a period of time that spans about 600 or 
p 
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700 years, the faculty in western universities and colleges have shown 
no sign of being willing to give up the position of prominence that 
they accord to the curriculum merek because it is less important to 
students' educations than it is to faculty careers. 
Thus, if faculty perceive an education problem, an} educational 
problem, they address it by revising the curriculum: they invent new 
courses, they pull in new authors, the,' add or delete prerequisites, and 
so on. To highlight the shortsightedness of the single-minded curric-
ular approach to every educational problem, I offer here a discussion 
of several educational variables crucially important to student learning 
that are visible to humanities teachers in every class they enter, but 
that, because they are variables that cannot be either defined or under-
stood in curricular terms, have not from the Renaissance to the pres-
ent received any serious attention. (I speak, of course, of serious atten-
tion across the profession, including institutional attention. There are 
many individual teachers who pay attention to these issues as a matter 
of personal insight and personal integrity, but such efforts do not 
change the shape of the profession.) There are many considerations 
that we "know" but that we nevertheless refuse to bring into hard 
focus. Thus the fact that we "know" these things doesn't wind up mak-
ing a difference in our classrooms. 
It doesn't matter, for example, that we know in advance, or should 
know, that learners forget most of what they learn in our classes unless 
they keep reinforcing that knowledge by becoming disciplinary spe-
cialists in our own fields. \X'hat students remember or don't remember 
is important to their education, but students are left mostly on their 
own to figure out what to do with the fact that the material they learn 
always evaporates on them. 
It doesn't matter that we know in advance, or should know, that 
teachedy modeling is what our students remember. Unfailingly, gradu-
ates with whom I have spoken over decades never mention one single 
piece of class content, but they are full of memories about me and 
their other teachers' tones of voice, everyday habits, boring talk, 
inspiring talk, tough grading, jokes, hairdos, kindness, wrinkled shirts, 
contempt, unavailability, and on and on. A half hour's conversation 
with past students would lead even a Barbie Doll to see that teachers 
teach themseli)es in wa)'S that remain much more memorable to their students over 
time than the content tbey work so bard to "get across. "We also seem never to 
focus on the truth that an important part of student learning is seeing 
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their teachers modeling for them the process of genuine learning. J\lost 
teachers are good at modeling the product of learning-what it looks 
like when you get there-but not the process that gets you there. 
I t doesn't matter that we know in advance, or should know, that our 
students' heads are full of education narratives from movies and tele-
vision that operate as powerful filters on student perception, such that 
students have a difficult time seeing what is really occurring in their 
own classrooms, and, sometimes, in their own minds. The outrageous 
Animal House (1978) was made years before this fall's crop of first-year 
students were born, but watching this film is still a rite of passage for 
an overwhelming majority of college students. 
It doesn't matter that we know in advance, or should know, that our 
students' desire not to fail is a much more potent motive for most of 
them than the desire to excel, and that teaching to students motivated 
by the former desire requires a substantially different approach than 
teaching to students motivated by the latter desire. 
It doesn't matter that we know in advance, or should know, that stu-
dents' evaluations of their teachers' ethics playa great role in their 
learning that will never rise to the surface in curricular discussion. 
However, students' ethicaljudgments trump other kinds ofjuq[!,me!2ts el'er), time. 
If students do not judge us to be fair, respectful, charitable, and cil'il-
judgments that most of them are forming by the end of the first class 
period, at least provisionally-it will not matter if they later, or ever, 
judge highly our disciplinary expertise. 
It doesn't matter that we know in advance, or should know, that our 
students stand in great peril. The\' stand in peril of merely getting a 
degree but not getting an education and never ha\·ing anyone tell them, 
not even us, what it is they are missing out on. They stand in peril of 
merely growing old, not different, and newr having anyone tell them, 
not even us, that an education is the surest way to capitalize on their 
instincts for growth and development. They stand in peril of ne\'er 
seeing that the aim of education is not learning how to fit in, but learn-
ing how to critique the terms of their own liws-in other words, 
learning how to become autonomous agents in the world-and they 
stand in peril of never having anyone tell them, not even us, that an 
education that masks autonomy in favor of learning how to fit in is 
merely a pretend education, not the real thing. These, after all, are aims 
of education notions, and I have seen no evidence in decades of teach-
ing that the faculty will ever take significant time away from discussing 
'1 
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the curriculum in order to get clear either with ourselves, our col-
leagues, or our students about the aims of education. 
It doesn't matter that we know in advance, or should know, that our 
main educational competition comes not from student resistance, but 
from commercial marketers. Commercial marketers are the teachers in 
American society whose pedagogy penetrates right to the core of peo-
ple's basic structure of desires. These are the teachers who persuade 
their "students," all of us who are real and potential customers, about 
what kinds of persons we want to be in the world, how we want to 
look, how we want to be valued, how we want to spend our money and 
time, and so on. Not only do commercial marketers know how to 
influence the very structure of people's desires, but they know how to 
co-opt our own educational rhetoric of autonomy, freedom, and 
choice, only they pervert these terms by redefining them and limiting 
their coverage to consumer issues. 
It doesn't matter that we know in advance, or should know, that stu-
dents' instrumental way of viewing the value of their college educa-
tion is not an entrenched ideology, but merely the mimicking of views 
that have been showd at them like fast food through a drive-up win-
dow for as long as they can remember. Students do not come to coll~2/ ll'ith 
an entrenched, lliefl-del'eloped philosophy ol education. They come with a lot of 
cliches, a lot of bromides, a lot of pre-scripted brown-and-sen-e 
notions they have heard forever, and a lot of anxieties. That we often 
treat students' instrumentalism as if it makes them enem\' combatants 
means that we are not thinking deeply about where our students are 
"coming from," as people say, or what they need from us in order to 
"get where the\' are going." 
It doesn't matter that we know in ad,-ance, or should know, that the 
students in our humanities classes are very likely facing the last oppor-
tunity of their lives to encode within themselves a mental habit of 
"questing for nuances" rather than "solving for X." This is a matter of 
learning the difference Fom tiS between the mental practice of persist-
ently unfolding the various nuances of life's intractable conundrums as 
a habit of life-a way of making life richer, fuller, more varied, and less 
prone to ideological rigidity or ethical arrogance-and the contrary 
mental habit of treating the world's conundrums on the model of an 
algebra problem that one "solves for X" and then mm'es on from, 
never again having a reason to revisit one's "answer." Do we not know 
that if our students never learn this difference while they are with us 
4 
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in humanities classes, they will probably never learn it at all? 
It doesn't matter that we kno\\~ in ad\'ance, or should know, that stu-
dents' shock is legitimate, understandable, and worthy of sympathy 
when the\' first hear from their college teachers that many of the adult 
competencies they ha\'e been working hard for eighteen or twenty 
years to master-they often look like deer caught in the headlights: 
"who knew this was coming?"-are now not good enoul}. \'Ce should 
know in advance that the common response of "kill the messenger" 
rather than "deal with the message" is mereh~ a knee-jerk defensive-
ness to cover their shock, not a premeditated attack on our education-
al values, methods, or us. Students have worked hard to develop views 
and opinions of the world that arc different and independent from 
those of their parents-a necessary stage on the wa\" to adulthood-
but we suddenly tell them that common sense is not their friend, that 
their views have to be tested against logic and evidence, and that their 
opinions are unearned and often indefensible. Students feel profound-
ly shocked when they discover the gulf between competf1lCf and excel-
lence, a gulf that they have never seen before but which we thrust in 
their faces every day in the classroom. 
It doesn't matter that we know in advance-or do we actually know 
it at all?-that the structure of knowledge in our disciplines is not the 
same thing as a philosophy of education, and that substitutil~f!, the for-
mer for the latter leaves our students, and us, unable to answer the 
most elemental academic question of all, "what's educational about 
education?" \X-Thenever we teach our disciplinary content without plac-
ing it for our students inside a transparent educational framework, we 
force them to infer that not "getting" our discipline leaves them une-
ducated. \'<'e do this because we so seldom indicate to our students-
other than invoking a few vague cliches such as the virtues of being 
"well rounded" or "thinking critically," whatever these phrases 
mean-that there is am' educational philosoph~' or any educational 
aims in our courses larger or more important, or, more telling, no edu-
cational aims different from our disciplinary content. 
Think about the amount of time, energy, and creative attentiveness 
that facult~· members devote to any of the issues I have just discussed 
compared to the amount of time, energy, and creative attentiveness 
they devote to discussing the curriculum. To repeat: if a problem we 
see doesn't map onto a curricular solution, then mostly it remains 
invisible and/or unsolved. 
.. 
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STILL WEDDED TO THE SAME OLD METAPHORS 
So, you may wonder, am I a heartless curriculum basher, a con-
temptible content leveler, a touclw-feely advocate of classrooms that 
are all about skills and feeling good but not about content? Not at all. 
\Xihat I'm bashing is not the curriculum, but the long habit of human-
ities teachers conflating the curriculum with education in general, and 
the even worse ancient practice of each teacher treating his or her 
small slice of the curriculum in a myopic, ethnocentric, partisan man-
ner that leaves students with the profoundly dysfunctional misimpres-
sion that being educated is just learning a bunch of disciplinary knowl-
edge. 
The curriculum matters, and it matters profoundly, but it is a means 
to an end, not an end in itself. It is a means to helping students acquire 
an education, not a mcans to making them disciplinary colleagues. 
None of us can help students get an education if the curriculum is not 
"right" (in the sense of "tlt" or "well adapted") for our educational 
aims, but it is a serious mistake to conflate disciplinary aims and edu-
cational aims. I could not stretch my students' linguistic capacities in 
my literature classes if m\' content consisted of Hallmark cards or 
internet blogs, but I need to remember that the level of my students' 
educational achie\'ement has much more to do with how the literature 
I teach accomplishes the "stretch" I am talking about than what it has 
to do with how much they remember from any single sonnet, nm,el, 
or lyric poem I teach. 
The humanities are stil! wedded to the same old metaphors of r~finement and 
l'irtue 1J'j' means of contal!,ion that ltJe sau' earlier in Petrarch, Sidn~y, and Shelley. 
Whether you are Sidney extolling the power of Homer's epics to teach 
learners about anger or love of country, or whether you are a post-
colonial theorist extolling the power of Chinua Achebe's novels to 
teach learners about the immorality of colonialism or a postmodern 
feminist extolling the power of Andrea Dworkin's essays to teach 
learners how to interrogate sexual/sexist practices, the underlying 
assumptions are that texts contain knowledge, that texts teach knowl-
edge by contagion, and that knowledge makes us "better." Modern 
educators are not as likely as Sidney to endorse explicitly an ethical 
program for humanities education, but the ethical program is always 
there. The "better" that knowledge makes us may be labeled by con-
temporary humanists not as an "ethical better" but, instead, as a more 
"politically conscious better," or a more "critically thinking better," or 
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a better who is "more tolerant of diversity," but these alterations of 
locution are mere quibbles. Better still means better: it refers to a 
change of ethos, and a change of dhoJ is what "ethical" analy'sis is all 
about. The profound faith that humanities teachers have always placed 
in the curriculum to make learners better entails the corollary assump-
tion (always silently held) that teachers' favored texts work their con-
tagious magic mostly all their own. If humanists did not silently assume 
this to be true, they would spend as much time thinking seriously 
about their pedagogy as they spend thinking about their curriculum. A 
rival assumption is not that textual/student contiguif]' accomplishes 
learning, but that learning is mostly a consequence of what learners 
are led to make of texts by means of teacherly modeling. 
WHY THE HUMANITIES REMAIN RELEVANT, BUT NOT LIKE 
CRESCENT WRENCHES OR CASH 
The point to m\' argument is not that the curriculum should be 
marginalized, or, worse, trivialized, but that effective humanities edu-
cation is a lot harder to accomplish, a lot more complicated to pursue, 
and entails the consideration of mam' issues a Jot more subtle than 
merely deciding what texts and courses we are going to teach. \\'e are 
not just disciplinary specialists, we are also educators, and we have a 
responsibility to develop our ideas and insights about education as 
carefully, as thoughtfully, and as fully as we dewlop our ideas and 
insights about our discipline, Except that, mostly, we don't. 
And we need to alter our metaphors. Students do not learn by con-
tagion, sympathy, inspiration, or contiguity. These traditional 
metaphors, embraced as much by those who oppose the traditional 
curriculum as by those who support it, blind teachers to the real 
process of learning. Contagion, sympathy, and contiguity are without 
doubt useful supplements to learning, and no teacher worth her salt is 
going to stand in the way of her students' sympathetic engagement 
with texts or with her own teaching, but we all know, if we reflect for 
a moment, that no matter how delightful contagion, sympathy, and 
contiguity might be, )J'e learn not simply ~y standing lIext to some learned per-
son or te,'! and "absorbing" what th~y knOll!, but /!y practicing. W7e learn by prac-
ticing, jlliling, practicing ((f!.ain, failing ~I!,aitl, and repeat/Il
e
g this process O1'el' and 
om; each tillle raisi1Zf!. the bar of achiel'flllfllt a little on the skill, iIlJ{gbt, kllOld-
edge, or methodology tlMt we are practicilZg. This is the meaning behind James 
Redfield's sagacious comment that 
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the function of an educational institution is to institutionalize 
failure, to control failure and set some tolerable limits on it. 
[ ... J An educational institution tries to match the problems to 
the student, to set him a challenge just a bit more difficult 
than the last, to allow him to fail without obliterating him so 
that he can fail again and finally succeed. (172-73) 
\'Ve also know that the priman' marker of an educated mind is not 
knowledge-the universe of knowledge is so immense that all of us 
are terminal beginners-but a person's ability to take whatever knowl-
edge he or she possesses and to deal with it thotlj!,htfully. iJltrospectilJe/y, 
critically, hOllestly. jlldiriolls!y. imaginatil'!'I)" ratiollal!y. aesthetically, and bUlJIb!y. 
flOt rusbill~!!, tojudgment and not ca/rit)'in/!, knowledge into ortbodo:<)! or ideolf{2)'. 
And we all know, or should know, that this kind of mind is acquired 
mostly by students watching their teachers model the operation of 
such minds in classrooms, not from reading texts. The aims and hopes 
that drive our curriculum from behind, so to speak, but that also 
define the aims that we are moving toward, include the larger goals of 
helping our students become persons with an educated sensibility, that 
is, persons who know how to liYe lives of intellectual perspicacity, per-
sonal enrichment, social responsibility, and moral integrity. 
Fine words, you may say-more high-flown rhetoric about the 
virtue "inspired" by the humanities-and you may wish to remind me 
that our students talk more about jobs and professions and the future 
than they do about \'irtue and self-development. You are right. Our 
students do talk about these things. They are taught to do so by their 
parents, friends, television, and their high school counselors. So if this 
is what students and their parents wish to talk about, we should be up 
to the task of saying how a humanities education will contribute to the 
aims of success and independence about which our students are so 
anxIous. 
But in order to do so, we will have to stop talking about the intrin-
sic value of students mastering our curriculum for the sake of the cur-
riculum or even for the sake of some imputed intrinsic utility it pos-
sesses. Who are we kidding here? \'{'hen I assign Thomas Gray's 
"Elegy in a Country Churchyard" to my students, I know that no one 
in their entire li\'es is going to ask them, or care, if they have ever read 
this poem, and I cannot be self-decei\'ing enough to think that anyone 
text is essential either to my students' self-development or to their pro-
fessional goals later in life. So I don't offer the poem to my students as 
q 
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knowledge. I still make them read it, and I don't apologize for making 
them work hard at understanding the language and the ideas in it, but 
I offer it to them as a kind of exercise regimen for the development 
of certain educable capacities that will help them construct the kind of 
educated mind that I described above: a mind marked by thoughtful-
ness, introspection, honesty, criticism, and so on. 
So, let's take the challenge head-on of talking turkey to students and 
their parents about the real yalue of a humanities education. How does 
such a discourse unfold? Let us take up the challenge in the strongest 
possible form, by defending the claim that students will be not just ade-
quately prepared for professional life by a humanities education, but 
will be better prepared for professional life by a humanities education 
than by any other kind, especially an education allegedly focused on 
professional skills alone. Here goes. l 
WHY A HUMANITIES EDUCATION IS 
THE BEST PREPARATION FOR PROFESSIONS 
To many students, to most parents of students either in college or 
heading for college, and, truth be said, to many non-humanities col-
lege teachers today, the claim that college students will prepare them-
selves better for professional success by majoring in any humanities 
field sounds, at best, fanciful, or, at worst, simply false. The explana-
tion for u'~y this claim sounds fanciful or false-perhaps a desperate 
fabrication advanced by literature and philosophy teachers trying to 
keep their jobs?-lies in American society's deep confusion about a 
number of issues having to do with human development, with the 
nature of learning, with the relationship between job skills and think-
ing skills, and the reasons for success or failure in professional work. 
The claim that sounds fanciful or false to many people can, in fact, be 
supported by reasoning and evidence that are available to anyone will-
ing to think past the misleading and, indeed, false cliches of popular 
culture. 
As most of the professional parents who are eager for their sons 
and daughters to major in business already know-if they stop to 
reHect-the colleagues and peers whom they have watched succeed 
and fail in their various professions over the years never do either one 
because they are either dufuses or masters of the specific kinds of 
technical skills that are taught in pre-professional college courses. 
Many of those peers labeled "failures" match the description of "the 
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student who is sure to make an A on am" test but \vho never has am"-
. . 
thing interesting to say," while many of those labeled "successes" 
match the description of "the student whose grades are unpredictable 
but who always has interesting things to say." In other words, as any-
one who has been a professional more than a few years knows, the real 
causes of why people either succeed or fail seldom if e,'er lie merely 
in technical incompetence, yet we keep telling our undergraduates that 
if they don't learn "job skills," they will fail in their professions" The 
fact that there is such an obvious and huge disjunction between the 
reality we liye with and the ideology we preach simply points to our 
deep confusion. 
Let me make this point in more concrete terms. Successful profes-
sionals only need to be reminded of what they already know, which is 
that they haye learned most of the specific skills that they needfortheir 
job on the job. Reading the spreadsheet, operating the computer, 
repairing a customer's car, installing software: these are the easy things. 
The difficult tasks have to do with forms of se/fmasterJ', such as the 
control of impulse and the rush to judgment, and the maintenance of 
professional re/ationsbips, such as helping someone else read the spread-
sheet, explaining to someone else why one wa\" of operating the com-
puter is better than another, danfyilicR to the customer why aligning the 
front wheels when he buys new tires is cheaper in the long run than 
not aligning the wheels, inl'ffltin.J', a new process or business initiatiYe, or 
descn"/Jing what you are doing as you install computer software to some-
one who does not understand your computer's operating system. 
Professional jobs, as all professionals know, are performed inside a 
matrix of social relationships and intellectual demands in which mas-
tery of social dynamics and general intelligence, not specific skills, are 
the determinative, operati,"e threads that weave a career into the fabric 
of either success or failure. 
But let me be even more concrete. Beyond the general issues of 
social dynamics and general intelligence, there are other requirements 
of being a professional that have even less to do with specific skills but 
that are even more determinative of whether one succeeds or not: 
requirements such as 
• knowing how to use language that is clear, graceful, eco-
nomical, and persuasive; 
• knowing how to treat other people with honesty, respect, 
and consideration; 
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knowing how to reflect on your own performance such 
that you can be self-critical and self-correcting; 
knowing how to judge the aesthetic shape of systems, pro-
posals, ideas, and so on such that you can see the differ-
ence between a system that is beautiful in a clean, bal-
anced, and compact way, as opposed to a system that is 
ugly in its clutter, unnecessary parts, and inefficient redun-
dancy; 
knowing how to solve problems with rational directness 
and logical precision; 
knO\ving how to invent a better process, a better mouse 
trap, a better means of connecting Point A and Point B, an 
alternative route, a different goal, a better world; and 
knowing how to take your own and others' physical pro-
clivities into account on the job, such that you don't push 
yourself and others past the point of efficiency and 
responsibility, such that you don't indulge yourself in phys-
ical attractions or physical repulsions at a personal le\'el 
when interacting with your colleagues, or such that you are 
unaware of the physical cues you are giving other people. 
The first point behind the enumeration of these professional 
requirements for success is that these are in fact the real requirements 
for success. The specific job skills that so many people in our society 
are so eager to see students acquire by taking pre-professional courses 
and avoiding courses in "irrelevant" domains such as the humanities 
simply have the relationship between education and success figured 
out in reverse order. Job-skills college courses teach skills that will be 
outdated b\' the time the students taking them enter the job market. 
These same skills, moreover, are the ones that are the easiest to learn 
and that are usually learned best on the job, not in college courses. The 
second point behind the enumeration of the rea! requirements for suc-
cess is that, contrary to the cultural cliches of the moment, the human-
ities teach these rea! requirements bffter than an) other program of stud)" and 
they teach them in robust, developed, and nuanced ways that students 
do not superficially recall as little nuggets of information, but that they 
deeply imbibe through practice as ways of thinking, evaluating, plan-
ning, analyzing, imagining, deliberating, speaking, writing, reading, and 
explaining. 
South Atlantic Review 139 
For example, if we agree with the assertion above that profession-
al success entails "using language that is clear, graceful, economical, 
and persuasive," it follows that we are talking about professional suc-
cess requiring an education in language, and there is no domain of study 
that focuses on the teaching of language skills in more depth, with 
more subtlety, and with greater comprehensiveness than humanities 
studies. In courses focusing on literature, languages, and texts and 
arguments in general, students practice, and thus encode, language 
skills that underwrite the requirements for success insofar as such suc-
cess is partly predicated on language skills. 
If we agree that "knowing how to treat other people with honesty, 
respect, and consideration" is also a prerequisite for success, it follows 
that we are talking about the skill of moral and etbical deliberation, and this 
is also a skill that students practice inside the domain of the humani-
ties. As students track the moral and ethical deliberation of characters 
in novels, plays, and poems; as they track the arguments of figures in 
historical texts; and as they analyze the arguments of philosophers and 
ethicists in philosophical treatises, they are forced to track, understand, 
and practice the deep skills of moral and ethical deliberation that they 
cannot do without in the realm of professional achievement. 
If we agree that "knowing how to reflect on your own performance 
such that you can be self-critical and self-correcting" is also a require-
ment for success, it follows that we are talking about the necessity of 
acquiring an education in the cognitil'e and intellectual skill of introspection, 
or, in simpler language, we are talking about the skill of thinking about 
thinking. It also follows that as students confront the voices, ideas, sen-
sibilities, self-accounts, explanations, arguments, and opinions of other 
people as embodied in historical, literary, and philosophical texts, as 
they confront the different way that "second languages" put the world 
together, they are prompted and cued tmvard the development of 
their own inner space that introspection requires. Most important, the 
inner space thus discovered by humanities study is not experienced 
solipsistically, but is a disccwery and a space that entails comparisons with 
the experience and ideas of others. 
If we agree that a requirement for professional success is "knowing 
how to judge the aesthetic shape of systems, proposals, ideas, and so 
on such that you can see the difference between an explanation or an 
hypothesis that is beautiful in a clean, balanced, and compact way, as 
opposed to ones that are ugly in their clutter, unnecessary parts, and 
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inefficient redundancy," it follows that what we are talking about is the 
skill of aesthetic responsiveness, and it also happens to be the case that 
when students are learning to understand, appreciate, interpret, and 
analyze language-based art forms such as novels, poems, and short 
stories, they learn to practice-often without realizing how deeply 
these forms of practice affect the operation of their perceptual sys-
tem-general standards of aesthetic responsiveness that will help 
them in many ways both in life and in professions. Developed skills of 
aesthetic responsiveness, for example, help students understand the 
difference between the kinds of language that articulate the depths of 
human life as opposed to the kinds of language that skim over the sur-
face of life by means of cliches, bromides, platitudes, and whatever the 
current "small talk" of the moment happens to be. 
If we agree that "knowing how to solve problems with rational 
directness and logical precision" is a requirement for professional suc-
cess, it follows that what we are talking about is the skill of reasoniJ1~g 
(often referred to as critical thinkiniJ, and it also follows that as students 
take humanities courses, they acquire a deep sense of how human 
minds operate when those minds know how to test the flow of opin-
ion, discourse, and assertion against such criteria as logic, reasonable-
ness, proper use of evidence, an ability to interrogate the connection 
between premises and conclusions, a deep suspicion of cant and rant, 
a visceral objection to overstatement, a stubborn resistance against the 
rush to judgment, and so on. 
lf we agree that a requirement for professional success is "knowing 
how to invent a better process, a better mouse trap, a better means of 
connecting Point A and Point B, an alternative route, a different goal, 
a better world," it follows that we are talking about the operations of 
imagination, that ability to see in our mind's eye what is not present 
before our physical eyes, but what could be made present in the physi-
cal world because we have first learned to see it in our imagination. 
Business, technology, government, institutions, and traditions grow 
rigid, britde, stale and unprofitable, in both fiduciary and psychologi-
cal senses, without the refreshments of vision and feeling that stem 
from imaginative liberation, imaginative alternatives, and imaginative 
insights. What's more, it turns out that job-skills courses cannot teach 
imagination: they are tied to skills that have already been formulated 
and calcified. \'V'hat's more again, it turns out that in the domain of the 
humanities-within the study of such fields as literature, history, phi-
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losophy, and languages-students encounter the richness of imagery, 
the complexities of language, the precision of utterances, the 
pyrotechnics of rhetorical nuance, and that persistent encounter with 
others unlike ourselves that stimulate their imaginations to grow in 
fecundity, robustness, vividness, and strength. 
If we agree that professional success entails "knowing how to take 
your own and others' physical proclivities into account on the job, 
such that ~'ou don't push yourself and others past the point of effi-
ciency and responsibility, such that you don't indulge vourself in 
explicit behaviors of physical attraction or physical repulsions when 
interacting with your colleagues, or such that you are unaware of the 
physical cues you are sending out in social contexts," it follows that we 
are talking about the skill of physicality, including physical self-com-
mand, physical forms of communication, and knowledge of physical 
limits and needs, such as the requirements for rest, exercise, good 
nutrition, and both the stresses and joys of physical companionship. It 
is difficult to imagine an\, jobs-skills course that might giYC students 
ways of thinking productively about the site of intersection between 
social exchange and individual physicality, a site that is vexed by our 
culture's exploitation of physicality as a primarY means of marketing 
and political suasion. In humanities courses, hmvever, students are per-
sistently invited to contemplate physicality in terms of historical per-
spectives, gender issues, and sex and sexual orientation issues. In art 
works of plastic, pictorial, musical, and literary kinds, students are 
given an education in physicality, the ethical and historical construc-
tions by which it may be interrogated, and the numberless accounts of 
physicality that are explored in narratives and poems. 
It turns out, in other words, that the requirements for professional 
success map with profound congruence onto such cognitive and intel-
lectual operations as lanl,uage, imagination, reasoning, moral and ethical delib-
eration, aesthetic responsil'elless, sociability, ill/rospection, and ph),sicalit}', and it 
turns out that these are the kinds of operations that students will not 
only encounter but will learn to develop on their own in humanities 
courses. The education that pretends that students are well-served by 
learning to push the buttons and pull the strings of specific job-skills 
is just that-a pretend education-but it is the case that the profundi-
ty of American confusion about these issues has created a public dis-
course and a current of opinion in which a pretend version of educa-
tion is persistently ,'alued, funded, pursued, and sold with more ener-
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gy, money, and attention than a real education, much to the disadvan-
tage of students \vho quickly learn that almost am'one in their first job 
can teach them what buttons to push and what strings to pull, but that 
if they do not learn from liS how to develop their fundamental capaci-
ties internally-and how to deploy them socially-they will have lost 
the chance to learn these skills foreveL 
The world's corporations and bureaucracies are not in the business 
of cueing and prompting fundamental forms of self-development. 
They expect their employees to fit the company curve. The students 
who have never learned to ask themselves if the company cun-e is or 
is not the same thing as a full, rich, challenging, or worthwhile life will 
have to discover-if they can-how to invent the form of education 
that asks these questions 011 their OJ},ll, and none of us can pretend that 
their odds of doing so are high. It is disheartening to consider how 
common a scenario these words describe, when a humanities educa-
tion that addresses the fundamental needs of self-development, self-
command, and self-completion is available to students during the 
whole four years of their college education, the same four \'ears in 
which outsiders from news analysts to high school counselors to 
everyone's Aunt Matilda eagerly urge students en masse to concentrate 
on forms of education that carry the least utility in the \vorid of human 
affairs both professional and personal. 
In the context of developing the skills discussed above, a humani-
ties education in languages and texts also de\-elops certain competen-
cies profoundly valuable in the arenas of professional striving. 
First, students who work on developing these skills learn the per-
sonal competency of accepting delayed gratification. Complex problems 
cannot be solved by brown-and-serw methods. Immature persons get 
frustrated with delayed gratification, and either work on the complex 
problems badl~' and fruitlessly, or move on to simpler problems that 
reward them more quickly. But not all professions can guarantee new 
employees that they will be rewarded every fiw minutes by having the 
boss attach their latest crayon drawing on the lunch room refrigerator 
with a smiley-face magnet. The students who become professionally 
successful must learn to deal with delayed gratification. 
Second, students who learn to live with delayed gratification also 
learn patience, and, with patience, they discover those inner recesses of 
self inside of which the \'irtues of self-knowledge and self-command 
may be developed. 
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Third, students who work on self-development skills learn how to 
live with uncertainty and ambiguity, not as frustrating problems that 
demand erasure, but as a more or less permanent dimension of com-
plexity. Students of the humanities share with students of the sciences 
an education which shows them that the world is stranger, more 
unpredictable, more complex, and more indecipherable than all of the 
world's collection of bromides, common sense views, cliches, and 
stereotypes can possibly account for. Professionals who know how to 
live with uncertainty and ambiguity He the world more as it is, and are 
less likely to deceive themselves about processes, products, and poli-
cies grounded in ideologies that pretend to possess certain knowledge 
and complete explanations. 
FOUlth, students who study the humanities learn the competency of 
looking for and employing non-scientific kinds of evidence. They 
learn to look for evidence of people's beliefs by examining their rhet-
oric and their metaphors. They learn to look for evidence of values 
and commitments by examining people's representations in narrative 
and poetry. They learn to look for evidence of causality by examining 
the data from history. They learn to look for differences and sameness 
in the human community by studying the images, idioms, linguistic 
locutions, and views of the world as embedded in different languages. 
On and on, in the humanities students learn that the world of scien-
tific evidence, conveyed mainly in terms of numbers, statistics, formu-
las, and proofs-as necessary and valid as these are-are complement-
ed by a vast array of evidence from forms of language and art and 
argument that, in their own way, are also profoundly revelatory of the 
conundrums of existence. Professionals in the world who know how 
to look for, how to use, and how to evaluate evidence are surely more 
realistic and effective in their understanding and promulgation of poli-
cies and products than professionals who elevate their wishes over evi-
dence and their desires over reality. 
rlfth, and perhaps most important of all, students who study inside 
the humanities learn a cognitive and intellectual competence that is 
perhaps the primary marker of any educated mind: the ability to pay 
prolonged analytical attention to the sub-component parts of complex 
structures, whether these structures are material, conceptual, artistic, 
linguistic, argumentative, musical, or whatever. The world is filled with 
complex structures that can neither be understood nor appreciated by 
looking merely at their surfaces or by waiting for the object under 
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scrutiny to announce its own meaning. Complex structures, including 
the structure of our own ideas, \'alues, and feelings, can onl\, be under-
stood by the patient analysis of how the sub-component parts of 
those complex structures actually work-how they actually allow the 
structure as a whole to bear its load of trucks or tone, its freight of 
meaning or mass-by a d)'namic that can onh' be understood through 
the mechanisms of detailed inquiry, not quick impressions or vapid 
common sense or current small talk. 
It turns out, then, that a humanities education trains students to 
claim for themselves a liberation of mind and intellect that prepares 
them to be successful in their lives and their careers simultaneouslY. This 
claim suggests another truth about which American society is pro-
foundly confused. This truth is that there iJ 110 ditli'rl'llcf bdl1'l'fll the 1m! 
educatioll for life and !he best educatioll for jobs. All that human beings ever 
bring to life both in their personal domains and professional domains 
is the same array of dispositions, skills, and wa\'s of making meaning. 
There is not a separate set of skills by which one understands one's 
professional tasks as opposed to one's non-professional tasks. Ife all 
have one brain and one Jet o{ skillJ andforms of undfl:rtanding that 11'1' mils! lise 
in all domainJ of endraJ·or. Life gi\'es us fundamental capacities that we 
either use and develop or that we don't. But these capacities are all we 
ever have as our tools, regardless of whether we are making love, mak-
ing war, making money, making meaning, or making nonsense, 
The education that addresses the development of these capacities, 
that prompts and cues them into wakefulness, into vibrancy, into fer-
tility, and that gives them content and stamina is the kind of education 
that people need for their lives and their professions alike. It is the 
honor and the glory of the humanities-or, in less lofty language, it is 
the job of the humanities-to provide students with this most neces-
sary and useful kind of education. 
NOTES 
I The remainder of this essay is a re\'ised \'ersion of a document that I created for an 
MLA ad-hoc committee called the Teagle \X'orking Group, a group of clbout twelve 
faculty members from different universities and colleges around the country who were 
sponsored (and funded) h a challenge from the Teagle Foundation to engage in a 
two-\'ear long series of deliberations focused on the problem of how to bring the 
English major into greater alignment with the aims of liberal education, I turned an 
earlier version of this argument over to the ad-hoc committee, but it has not been pre-
viousl\' published, and I cannot sa\' at this time what role it will play in the commit-
tee's final report. 
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